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1  Introduction
Section 118 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
(“LGMS Act”) provides for two interrelated but also seemingly independent 
mechanisms that secure a municipality’s claim for the payment of “municipal 
service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, 
levies and duties” that are overdue with respect to immovable property 
(henceforth referred to as “municipal debts”). Hence, the section seemingly 
establishes statutory real security rights in favour of municipalities. The 
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) in City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe1 (“Mathabathe”) calls for a closer 
look at especially section 118(3).
Section 118(1) contains an “embargo” or “veto” provision in terms of which 
the municipality will refuse to issue a so-called clearance certificate unless all 
municipal debts for the preceding two years have been settled in full. If the 
certificate is not issued, the registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of 
the property concerned. This rule is confirmed by section 92(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937. Therefore, as the title of section 118 indicates, the 
municipality’s security involves a restraint on the transfer of the property until 
such time as the amounts due for the previous two years have been paid. The 
payment of this “two-year debt” is effectively secured in this manner and 
naturally it is preferent to all other claims that might have to be paid from 
the proceeds of the sale of the property, except for certain qualifications in 
insolvency law.2
*  Thank you to Chantelle Gladwin, André van der Walt, Gerhard Brits and the two anonymous referees for 
their valuable comments
1 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA)
2 S 118(2) of the LGMS Act states that the section is subject to s 89 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
      
Even though section 118(1) has been the subject of controversy as well,3 the 
focus of this contribution is on the real security right established by section 
118(3). The subsection provides that an amount due for municipal debts “is 
a charge upon the property in connection with which the amount is owing”. 
Notably this subsection, unlike section 118(1), involves no time limit and 
therefore the charge secures the payment of all outstanding municipal debts, 
and not only of the debts for the previous two years.4 Even more strikingly, 
the charge “enjoys preference over any mortgage bond registered against the 
property”, and the fact that the bond was registered before the charge came 
into existence, or before the Act came into force, makes no difference.5
These provisions have been a source of disquiet over the last couple of years 
and the SCA has had the opportunity to pronounce on their interpretation a 
number of times.6 The latest important case on section 118 is the one under 
discussion. Although the decision apparently provides clarity as to the nature 
of a municipality’s rights, it raises some questions as well. The purpose of 
this contribution is to expose one particular issue surrounding the statutory 
security measure in section 118(3) that is in need of further contemplation, 
namely its possible enforcement against successors in title. A subsequent 
unreported judgment of the high court7 seems to provide some direction in 
this respect, but because Mathabathe was decided by the SCA, only that court 
(or the Constitutional Court) can authoritatively clarify the legal position. It 
is important that there should be more clarity regarding the functioning and 
consequences of section 118(3), since it may have significant implications in 
the context of transfers of ownership of land and sectional title units, as well as 
the registration, enforcement and the security value of mortgage bonds. This 
contribution is not a comprehensive analysis of the matter, but it highlights 
some of the issues and provides brief comments as to the way section 118 
should be interpreted on this point.
3 See for example Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government 
and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC)  For a discussion, see especially AJ van der Walt “Retreating 
from the FNB Arbitrariness Test Already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; 
Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 SALJ 75
4 BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2005 4 SA 336 (SCA) para 11; City of 
Johannesburg v Kaplan NO 2006 5 SA 10 (SCA) paras 13, 20; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 9  For present purposes I do not consider the role of prescription
5 BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2005 4 SA 336 (SCA) paras 13-14
6 Notable examples with regard to s 118(3) include BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality 2005 4 SA 336 (SCA); City of Johannesburg v Kaplan NO 2006 5 SA 10 (SCA); City of Cape 
Town v Real People Housing (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 196 (SCA)  For discussions, see M Kelly-Louw “Selling 
or Leasing Property? Beware of Municipal Debts! A Note in Two Parts (Part I)” (2005) 122 SALJ 557; M 
Kelly-Louw “Selling or Leasing Property? Beware of Municipal Debts! A Note in Two Parts (Part II)” 
(2005) 122 SALJ 778
7 Perregine Joseph Mitchell v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Authority NGP 08-09-2014 case no 
50816/14 (judgment on file with author), discussed in part 3 2 below
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2  The Mathabathe case
2 1  Factual background and decision
After the first respondent’s immovable property was sold at a public 
auction, his agent (and mortgage creditor) instructed its attorney to see to 
the registration of the transfer of ownership. The attorney applied to the City 
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (“the Municipality”) to issue the 
clearance certificate that is required in order for transfer to take place. Section 
118(1) of the LGMS Act provides as follows:
“(1) A registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of property except on production to that registrar 
of deeds of a prescribed certificate –
(a)  issued by the municipality or municipalities in which that property is situated; and
(b)  which certifies that all amounts that become due in connection with that property for municipal 
service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties 
during the two years preceding the date of application of the certificate have been fully paid.”
The certificate that the Municipality issued indicated a total outstanding 
amount of R162,722.26, which included an amount of R151,324.22 – the 
so-called “historical debt”.8 The historical debt is that part of the total that 
is due for rates and services rendered prior to the two-year period. In other 
words, section 118 distinguishes between two parts of the total municipal 
debt, namely the part owing for rates and services rendered within the two 
years preceding the application for a clearance certificate and the part owing 
for services rendered before the two years. Section 118(3) secures both parts, 
whereas section 118(1) restrains transfer only with regard to the former. It is 
useful to refer to these parts as the “two-year debt” and the “historical debt”.
After an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Municipality to furnish 
the certificate without taking account of the historical debt, the attorney 
applied to the North Gauteng High Court, seeking an order compelling the 
Municipality to issue a statement indicating only the amounts that became 
due during the preceding two years. Furthermore, she requested an order that 
the Municipality issue a clearance certificate in terms of section 118(1) as 
soon as the two-year debt is paid, and that the Municipality be ordered to 
adhere strictly to section 118(1).9 The Municipality opposed the relief sought 
and initiated a counter application for an order that R87,440.17 (apparently 
the two-year debt) must be paid before it issues the clearance certificate, 
which would enable registration of the transfer. Secondly, the Municipality 
wanted the court to order the respondents to provide it with an undertaking 
that the arrear amount of R87,743.64 (the historical debt) will be paid to the 
Municipality on the date of registration or within a reasonable time thereafter, 
in accordance with section 118(3) of the Act.10
In the court a quo Goddey AJ granted the relief sought by the respondent 
and dismissed the Municipality’s counter application. The case under 
8 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 3
9 Para 4
10 Para 5  Nowhere in the judgment is there any explanation as to the discrepancy between the amounts 
indicated on the initial certificate and the amounts claimed by the municipality
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discussion concerns the Municipality’s appeal against the high court’s 
decision. The Municipality indicated that it did not appeal against the order 
that granted the relief sought by the attorney but only against the rejection of 
its counter application. The Municipality explained that it initially believed 
that it could withhold the clearance certificate unless it had an undertaking 
that the historical debt would be paid subsequent to registration. Yet, it now 
conceded that the respondents were entitled to the clearance certificate if the 
two-year debt was paid. Accordingly, the Municipality only appealed against 
the high court’s rejection of its claim for an undertaking that the historical 
debt be paid upon registration.11
The Municipality contended that the respondents’ attorney failed to have 
regard to section 118(3) of the Act, which provides as follows:
“(3) An amount due for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other municipal 
taxes, levies and duties is a charge upon the property in connection with which the amount is owing 
and enjoys preference over any mortgage bond registered against the property.”
Therefore, the Municipality based its counter application on the “lien 
(hypothec)” that section 118(3) grants it over the property and the preference 
that it enjoys over registered mortgage bonds by virtue of this security.12 It 
appears that the reason why the Municipality insisted on an undertaking for 
the payment of the historical debt is that, without it and upon registration, the 
conveyancer would pay the outstanding moneys to the mortgagee and therefore 
that the Municipality would lose its rights under section 118(3). By virtue 
of the “lien” that section 118(3) provides the Municipality for the historical 
debt, it claimed that it is only obliged to issue the clearance certificate when 
it receives an undertaking from the transferring attorney that it will receive 
the amount of the historical debt upon registration or within a reasonable time 
thereafter.13
Consequently, it seems that the Municipality understood the nature of its 
right under section 118(3) to be that it is entitled to an undertaking for the 
amount of that debt. However, as the SCA’s analysis indicates, the Municipality 
was labouring under a misconception as to nature of the real security right it 
enjoys in terms of section 118(3) of the Act. Indeed, the undertaking that the 
Municipality was seeking turned out to be superfluous, because the security 
right, contrary to the Municipality’s previous assumptions, does not fall away 
when the property is transferred.
2 2  The Supreme Court of Appeal’s analysis
The court explained that municipalities are assisted to enforce their debts 
in two ways – by being granted a charge upon the property (section 118(3)) 
and by being afforded an ability to prevent transfer of ownership until the 
two-year debt has been paid (section 118(1)).14 Therefore, the Act provides 
11 Paras 6-7
12 Para 8
13 Para 8
14 Para 9, citing City of Cape Town v Real People Housing (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 196 (SCA) para 2
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municipalities with a right of veto or embargo (with a time limit) as well as a 
security (without a time limit).15 Although both aspects are aimed at ensuring 
payment of municipal debts, they involve different mechanisms.16
Section 118(3) is “an independent, self-containing provision”,17 and the 
security it provides amounts to a lien that has the effect of a tacit statutory 
hypothec.18 The court moreover explained that no limit is placed on the 
duration of the security, save for insolvency.19 The effect of this tacit statutory 
hypothec is to create a security for the payment of municipal debts so that 
the Municipality will enjoy a preference over a registered mortgage bond.20 
It should be pointed out that the description of the right as a “lien” that has 
the effect of a “tacit statutory hypothec” is unnecessarily strained. Since this 
security right is created by statute and therefore sui generis, one should not try 
to fit it into the traditional categories of real security rights. Instead, it should 
be referred to by the name it is given in the statute, namely a “charge”, or more 
generally as a statutory security right.
The SCA further emphasised that the section 118(3) security is a charge upon 
the property and, for the definition of a “charge”, it referred to the decision in 
Irwin v Davies.21 Based on a legal dictionary, that court held that a charge on 
property is security for payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.22 
The SCA also quoted the explanation given in City of Johannesburg v Kaplan 
NO:23
“Any amount due for municipal debts (ie not limited by the aforesaid period of two years) that have 
not prescribed is secured by the property and, if not paid and an appropriate order of court is obtained, 
the property may be sold in execution and the proceeds applied in payment of the debts. In such 
event, the proceeds will be applied to payment of the municipal debts in full. Only after satisfaction 
of such debts will the remainder, if any, be available for payment of the debt secured by a mortgage 
bond over the property.”24
The SCA explained that section 118(3), unlike section 118(1), is not an 
embargo provision, but self-evidently a security provision. According to 
the court this point was misunderstood by the Municipality in that it did 
not distinguish between the two remedies available to it. Based on this 
misconstrued understanding of section 118(3), the Municipality therefore 
claimed, in addition to its security, an undertaking for payment of the historical 
15 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 9, citing City of 
Johannesburg v Kaplan NO 2006 5 SA 10 (SCA) para 13
16 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 9, citing BOE Bank 
Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2005 4 SA 336 (SCA) para 7
17 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 10, citing BOE Bank 
Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2005 4 SA 336 (SCA) para 8
18 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 10, citing Stadsraad 
van Pretoria v Letabakop Farming Operations (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 911 (T) 917; BOE Bank Ltd v City of 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2005 4 SA 336 (SCA) para 7
19 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 10, citing City of 
Johannesburg v Kaplan NO 2006 5 SA 10 (SCA) para 20
20 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 10, citing City of 
Johannesburg v Kaplan NO 2006 5 SA 10 (SCA) para 16
21 1937 CPD 442
22 447
23 2006 5 SA 10 (SCA)
24 Para 26, quoted at City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 11
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debt. This claim for an undertaking (effectively an additional security) hence 
had to fail and the SCA dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the Municipality 
was “plainly wrong” when it asserted that it would “lose its rights” in terms 
of section 118(3) when transfer is registered.25 This statement by the court 
is the crux of the matter, since it implies that the charge remains intact and 
hence that the Municipality will not lose its rights to the property when it is 
transferred. Therefore, the charge seems to be enforceable against successors 
in title. But is this conclusion as simple as it seems?
3  Discussion
3 1  Main inference from Mathabathe
The apparent implication of Mathabathe (although one could argue this to 
be obiter) is that a municipality’s security right under section 118(3) survives 
a transfer of the property – the charge, if not enforced, is carried over to 
subsequent owners. As Cloete puts it:
“A purchaser of immovable property, not bought from an insolvent estate, can no longer accept that, 
on registration of transfer, he or she acquires the property free of any municipal debt.”26
Cloete further explains that this state of affairs creates a problem for 
financial institutions that grant loans on the security of registered mortgage 
bonds.27 He is also concerned about what would happen if a municipality 
only discovers the existence of historical debt after the property has been 
transferred.28 Therefore, it is important to obtain clarity regarding the exact 
nature of the municipality’s real security right and to establish distinct rules 
for the enforcement of this right. Many practitioners might now be uncertain 
as to the effect of section 118(3) on property transactions and, to play it safe, 
many probably share Cloete’s assumption. However, in my view the conclusion 
reached by Cloete – although a logical inference from Mathabathe – is, all 
things considered, not an acceptable interpretation of section 118(3).
3 2  Impact of the Mitchell case
Before continuing with a discussion of the interpretation of section 118(3) in 
view of the Mathabathe case, it is necessary to briefly consider the implications 
of the subsequent unreported high court case of Perregine Joseph Mitchell v 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Authority29 (“Mitchell”). Regarding 
the nature of the section 118(3) charge, the court confirmed that it is “a real 
right of security created by statute in favour of the municipality”.30 The court 
moreover stated that there is, generally speaking, no reason why transfer 
in the normal course of business should terminate the real right while the 
25 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 12
26 B Cloete “Clearance Certificates: Does the Municipality’s Lien Survive the Transfer?” (2013) 534 De 
Rebus 46 46
27 46
28 47
29 NGP 08-09-2014 case no 50816/14
30 Para 9
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principal debt is still outstanding.31 However, the court realised that “there 
is more to this than meets the eye”.32 With reliance on Voet,33 the court held 
that, although the point of departure is that immovable property is transferred 
subject to all real burdens (such as real security rights), an exception in this 
regard is when the property is sold in execution, since the new owner receives 
a so-called “clean title”.34 Yet, although the security right falls away, this does 
not impact the personal obligation that remains on the previous owner to pay 
the outstanding debt.35
Therefore, the court’s conclusion was that, at least when it comes to sales 
in execution, the section 118(3) charge will not survive transfer of the land, 
despite the contrary conclusion that could be drawn from the SCA’s comments 
in Mathabathe. However, it is important to appreciate that, even if the ratio 
and conclusion reached in Mitchell on this point are correct,36 it only applies 
to sales in execution and not to normal sales. In the discussion below, I express 
my agreement with the prospect that the section 118(3) charge does not 
survive transfer of the land, but I rely on different reasoning, which can apply 
to both sales in execution and normal sales. The Mitchell case (decided by 
the high court) does not overrule and probably will not be enough to resolve 
the uncertainties caused by the SCA in Mathabathe. Consequently, one can 
expect that the SCA itself – and perhaps even the Constitutional Court – will 
be called upon to clarify this matter in due course.
3 3  Interpretation of section 118(3)
The fact that section 118(3) describes the municipal debt as a “charge upon 
the property” is important because it reveals the intended legal nature of the 
preference – at least on face value. In this regard it seems like the charge 
is not enforceable against the owner in his personal capacity, but rather in 
his capacity as owner of the property to which the debt relates. Because the 
debt constitutes a charge upon the land, it is of a real nature; it grants the 
municipality a right in rem and accordingly it is enforceable against successors 
in title. The Act classifies the municipal debt as serving the property itself and 
not the owner or occupier. Therefore, it seems correct that a “charge upon 
the property” is enforceable against whoever is the owner of the property, 
notwithstanding that a previous owner or occupier might have incurred the 
debt. Of course, the “charge upon the property” is irrespective of any personal 
claims that the municipality might have against previous owners or other 
occupiers, but the municipality obviously has a better chance of recouping 
the debts by relying on the charge (which is a real right) than by suing the 
31 Para 9, quoting from City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) para 
12
32 Perregine Joseph Mitchell v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Authority NGP 08-09-2014 case no 
50816/14 para 10
33 Voet 20 1 13
34 Perregine Joseph Mitchell v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Authority NGP 08-09-2014 case no 
50816/14 paras 12-14; and also the other sources cited there
35 Para 15
36 For instance, it is not clear whether Voet 20 1 13 (referring to hypothec, hence mortgage) can without more 
apply to a security right such as the sui generis charge created in s 118(3) of the Act
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previous owner based on a personal claim. It appears that the only recourse 
for the new owner, if he is held liable, may be to sue the previous owner 
based on unjustified enrichment, but this will mostly not be a realistic solution 
and, even if possible, the existence of such a remedy does not in itself justify 
the alleged wide interpretation of section 118(3). Therefore, the interpretation 
that the “charge” stays with the land despite being sold and transferred is 
something that needs re-consideration, because the consequences could be 
too inhibiting for property owners and mortgagees.
Although there is a general principle that limited real rights are enforceable 
against successors in title, it is actually not the normal course of events in 
the law of real security. For example, it is usually intended that a mortgage 
bond should be cancelled when the property is sold and that the claim of the 
mortgagee (and other right holders) must be satisfied from the proceeds of the 
sale. This is trite practice and, in fact, it is not possible to transfer immovable 
property without cancelling the mortgage bond.37 Therefore, it would be 
strange if there were widespread occurrences of unpublicised charges upon 
property that survive transfers of the land, so that subsequent owners might 
be held liable for the debt.38
Another normal feature of conventional real security rights is the principle 
that the burden on the property is publicised, in the case of land, through 
registration. This is not the case with section 118(3), since the Act provides 
no way to afford publicity to the municipality’s charge.39 Consequently, the 
disputed wide interpretation of section 118(3) does not fit into the system 
of real security rights very well, since it contradicts not only the publicity 
principle but also the normal expectations with regard to the operation of real 
security rights over land. This notwithstanding, a literal reading of the section 
could lead to a conclusion that the charge follows the property regardless of 
what the consequences might be.
It is, however, argued that it could never have been the legislature’s intention 
to grant a municipality a real security right, the enforcement of which could 
be postponed until any arbitrary time in future. The strongest indication of 
this is the rule that the charge enjoys a security in preference to the rights of a 
mortgagee. Therefore, when land is sold and transferred in the normal course 
of events or through a sale in execution, the municipality’s claim must be 
satisfied in full before a mortgagee may receive payment.40 It would not make 
sense to violate this order of preference by paying the mortgagee only and 
thus to allow the municipality’s charge to remain “upon the property” until 
37 S 56(1) of the Deeds Registries Act; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 364-365
38 Although an enrichment lien might have this effect as well, this is controversial in itself and in any event 
might be more justifiable because of the value that the lien holder added to the land in question and 
because his physical possession/occupation creates some publicity
39 Compare s 31 of the Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002, which also entails a 
statutory “charge” upon land, but in that case a form of publicity is provided by means of a note that the 
registrar must make against the records of the land in question  However, it is otherwise not uncommon 
for statutory security rights to be vested without fulfilment of the publicity principle
40 In the case under discussion this was clearly also the municipality’s expectation – hence its insistence on 
an undertaking that the debts would be paid from the proceeds of the sale before the mortgagee is paid
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such time in future when the municipality wishes to enforce it or discovers 
old unpaid debts. In effect, the municipality’s charge logically precludes any 
payment to a mortgagee before the charge has been satisfied.
Therefore, reading the section as a whole, there is – in my view – no option 
but for the municipality’s debt to be settled before the mortgagee is paid.41 
Practically, nothing else makes sense. A secured creditor cannot forego its 
place in the order of preference, only to resume it again at some arbitrary later 
stage – even if the creditor is the state. Section 118(3) should have incorporated 
a distinct rule regarding the satisfaction of the charge at the time that the 
property is alienated and the proceeds are distributed. Although this is not 
expressly stipulated in the section, one could read it in as a logical implication, 
especially if the municipality’s secured position in preference to mortgagees 
is to have practical effect.
A comparable interpretation of section 118(3) is supported by Gladwin, 
who suggests that the municipality’s security right is only intact until the 
property is transferred.42 The implication of this argument is that, if the 
municipality does not receive (or claim) payment in terms of section 118(3) 
when the property is realised, it loses its “charge” and cannot rely on it at a 
later stage against subsequent owners and mortgagees.
3 4  Constitutional perspective
Another aspect of section 118(3) that one must consider is the important 
principle that the effects of statutory security rights must comply with the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). In 
recent years statutory security rights and execution measures have been the 
subject of quite a number of key Constitutional Court judgments.43 Except for 
brief remarks, a full analysis of these cases and how the principles developed 
in them could apply to the carry-over of section 118(3)’s “charge” to subsequent 
owners and mortgagees falls outside the scope of this contribution. However, 
if an instance should come up where an owner of land is held liable (by virtue 
of the charge upon his land) for the municipal debts incurred by a previous 
owner, the current owner might want to challenge the constitutionality of the 
application of the “charge” to him. The same goes for a subsequent mortgagee 
41 This is also why the court held that no undertaking for the payment of the debts was necessary in the 
present case, since s 118(3) guarantees payment
42 C Gladwin “Historical Municipal Debt” (23-01-2014) GhostDigest <http://www ghostdigest co za/
articles/historical-municipal-debt/54489> (accessed 15-09-2014)
43 See for example First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (s 114 of the 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964); Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett 
v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) (s 118(1) of the LGMS Act); Chief Lesapo 
v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) (s 38(2) of the North West Agricultural Bank Act 14 
of 1981); First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa; Sheard v 
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 2000 3 SA 626 (CC) (s 34 of the Land Bank Act 13 of 1944, 
in the meantime replaced with Act 15 of 2002)
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whose claim, by virtue of this interpretation of section 118(3), is ranked below 
the claim of a municipality for debts owed by a previous owner.44
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that no law (including the LGMS 
Act) may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.45 Without going into any 
details, the decisions in both First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA 
Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance46 (“FNB”) and Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng47 (“Mkontwana”) are authority for 
the proposition that statutory security rights involve deprivation of property. 
The cases show that statutory security rights generally are constitutionally 
acceptable ways for state institutions to enforce payment of their debts. 
However, it is also clear that there may be situations where the burden 
imposed on the property goes too far or has an effect on the owner that 
is disproportionate to the purpose of the security right. Therefore it is not 
a given that section 118(3) should be allowed to have an unqualified effect 
on successors in title and subsequent mortgagees. As was found in FNB,48 
a deprivation of property will be arbitrary if the law in question provides 
insufficient reason for the deprivation. As the outcome of FNB also shows, a 
very good reason will probably have to be provided if the deprivation has the 
effect of holding someone other than the actual debtor liable for the payment 
of a debt to the state. In Mkontwana49 the court held that it is justifiable for an 
owner to be held liable for municipal debts incurred by occupiers of his land 
(even unlawful ones). The explanation for this decision, put briefly, was that 
owners have a responsibility to ensure that people do not unlawfully occupy 
their land and incur debts; and furthermore that the debts benefit the land 
itself, rendering owners liable even though they did not personally make use 
of the services for which the debts were incurred. The reasoning of the case 
has been criticised50 but even if one accepts it for present purposes, the same 
reasoning cannot be applied to a subsequent owner who has absolutely no 
control over the occupation of the land or over the debts that were run up with 
regard to municipal services before he became owner.
To argue that the purchaser should have checked whether there were 
outstanding historical debts, or that he should have provided for this eventually 
in the contract of sale, is not convincing either. For example, information 
44 Compare for example the analysis by L du Plessis “Observations on the (Un-)constitutionality of Section 
118(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000” (2006) 17 Stell LR 505 520-526
45 In general, see AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) ch 4
46 2002 4 SA 768 (CC), particularly paras 57-60
47 2005 1 SA 530 (CC), particularly paras 31-33
48 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100
49 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 
2005 1 SA 530 (CC) paras 44-54
50 See especially Van der Walt (2005) SALJ; and also C Gladwin The Constitutionality of Municipal Policy 
Regarding the Opening of Municipal Service Accounts with Specific Reference to Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) LLM dissertation Unisa (2013)
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regarding outstanding municipal debts is not freely available to the public 
so as to create some sort of publicity that purchasers can rely on. Moreover, 
why should the responsibility to ensure that prior debts are not charged to a 
subsequent owner be on him? An argument that a purchaser should exercise 
a degree of due diligence is perhaps not without merit, but it is not strong 
enough justification for the imposition of a real burden on his property.
What is more, due to the operation of section 118(1), any charge in terms of 
section 118(3) will in almost all instances only be a charge with regard to debts 
older than the two years before the property has been sold, since the two-
year debt would have had to be paid before the property was sold. This factor 
means that the charge (for historical debts) is even further removed from the 
new owner’s ability to control the debt or enjoy the services, because it relates 
to debts and services of more than two years before he acquired the land. 
Similar reasoning applies to a subsequent mortgagee, who obviously has no 
control over or knowledge of the debts incurred by previous owners, and who 
enjoys no (or minimal) benefits from municipal debts incurred years before.51
Consequently, section 118 must be interpreted and applied in a way that does 
not authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. A charge upon one’s property 
imposed by legislation so as to secure a debt that one did not incur is certainly 
suspect and must be scrutinised in view of section 25. From a subsequent 
mortgagee’s perspective the matter is just as serious, if not more so. The fact 
that the municipality’s charge has priority over a current mortgagee’s claim 
(despite the fact that the mortgage might have been registered before the 
charge came into being) is already an extraordinary arrangement that raises 
questions of its own.52 But, the doubts one can raise are even more serious if 
the charge enjoys priority over a subsequent mortgagee’s rights, for example, 
in a sale in execution. Consequently, the wide application of section 118(3) 
cannot be accepted without more, because – if interpreted to be enforceable 
against successors in title – it clearly has the potential to interfere unjustifiably 
with the property rights of subsequent owners and bondholders.
Although the state is permitted to use legislation to create exceptional 
rights of preference for the enforcement of debts, it is important to consider 
that such measures are subject to constitutional control. As with all areas of 
state regulation, the impact of these measures can be tested for constitutional 
compliance. A more comprehensive analysis than the comments I made here 
can probably be undertaken,53 but the basic point is that the charge provided in 
section 118(3) must be treated with care because, taken to its logical extreme, 
the results could be unacceptable.
It can be mentioned in passing that, as the conclusion of Du Plessis’s article 
suggests,54 it may also be time to revisit the current approach of section 
51 See Du Plessis (2006) Stell LR 520-526
52 See for example M Kelly-Louw “Municipalities Versus Bondholders – Who Won?” (2006) 20 Speculum 
Juris 160; M Kelly-Louw “Municipal Debts – Are They Killing Mortgage Bonds?” (2005) 13 Juta’s 
Business Law 121; M Kelly-Louw “The Preferential Right of the Local Government or the Body Corporate 
Above that of the Mortgage Bondholder during Insolvency Proceedings” (2004) 2 Speculum Juris 169
53 For example, with reference to the type of arguments made by Du Plessis (2006) Stell LR 520-526  
54 529-530
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118(3)’s charge being unlimited in time when it comes to the debt that it 
secures. If section 118(3) – like section 118(1) – was made subject to a two-
year limit, the question that Mathabathe has created would not have been an 
issue. If the charge only secured the payment of the “two-year debt” in the 
event of a sale in execution of the property, there would have been no question 
of the charge surviving a transfer of the property. The reason for this is that, 
in the event of normal sales, the two year debt would have been paid before 
the clearance certificate was issued and there would be no charge upon the 
property when the new owner receives transfer. However, because the topic of 
this note is not the time-limit issue as such, nothing further needs to be said in 
this regard, except that it is certainly a factor to keep in mind when a broader 
analysis of section 118 is undertaken.
4  Conclusion
Read as a whole, section 118(1) and (3) should, in my view, be interpreted as 
follows. This interpretation makes practical sense and avoids the constitutional 
difficulties pointed out above: In terms of section 118(1), if any debts for the 
previous two years are outstanding (the “two-year debt”), the property cannot 
be transferred to a purchaser. Conversely, if the two-year debt is paid, the 
property can be transferred. Section 118(3) should then preferably kick in at 
this stage when the property is sold and transferred, and it is at this time 
when the municipality should enforce its charge as security for payment of the 
remaining (historical or pre-two year) debt.
The claim that the municipality has in preference to the mortgagee should 
be settled and paid from the proceeds of the sale at the time of transfer, or 
alternative security should be given to the municipality for full payment 
of the historical debt from the proceeds of the sale.55 In other words, the 
municipality must rely on its charge in some way or another at or before the 
point of transfer (and at no stage after this). Practically speaking it would 
be the conveyancer’s duty to ensure that the municipality is paid before the 
mortgage debt is settled. It may even be that, if the conveyancer fails to attend 
to the municipality’s claim, he might face liability.56
To interpret section 118(3) so that the municipality can simply elect to not 
enforce its claim before or at the point of transfer, but rather at some uncertain, 
later stage and against a subsequent owner and in priority to a subsequent 
mortgagee, would contravene any sense of rationality or justice. In my view, 
it cannot be interpreted to give the municipality the power to postpone 
enforcement of the historical debt until some arbitrary point in time when it 
deems fit. Statutory security rights (and related powers) granted to the state 
must, because of the extraordinary burdens they impose, be interpreted strictly 
– especially if the principle of publicity is bypassed. Another interpretation 
that indeed allows the municipality to enjoy a charge against a subsequent 
55 The seller can also give the municipality an acknowledgment of debt and make arrangements regarding 
payment of the historical debt, in which case the municipality is necessarily waiving its right to rely on 
the property as security for the debt
56 See H Jackson “Not Much Comfort for Conveyancers” (2013) 13 Without Prejudice 45
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owner or mortgagee, which it can impose when it wants to, would in all 
likelihood be unconstitutional. However, as suggested here, it is possible to 
interpret the section to avoid such unconstitutionality.
SUMMARY
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v 
Mathabathe 2013 4 SA 319 (SCA) may have some implications for the interpretation of section 118(3) 
of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. This subsection provides that municipal 
debts constitute a “charge” upon the immovable property to which the debts relate. In other words, 
municipalities are afforded a type of statutory real security right that secures payment of the debt. A 
potential problem with the decision is that one could read it to mean that the municipality’s security 
right is enforceable against successors in title, hence that it continues to exist even after the property 
has been transferred to a new owner. This prospect is controversial because it could have the effect that 
a later owner is held liable for the municipal debts incurred by a previous owner. Just as problematic, 
the municipality’s charge would enjoy preference above the claims of mortgagees. This contribution 
discusses the case and briefly considers whether the supposed interpretation is sustainable. A 
suggestion is made regarding the way in which section 118(3) should be interpreted so that it makes 
practical sense, has fair consequences and is in line with section 25(1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. The conclusion is that the municipality’s charge is not enforceable 
against successors in title, but that it must be enforced before or at transfer of the property.
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